What the world's largest land-defence show says about the rearmament cycle.
In 2018, armed drones were close to taboo on the European stands. By 2024, the consensus on the floor was that almost every drone on display could carry a weapon.
The show did not change its rules. The war next door changed what the industry was willing to sell in public.
Eurosatory is the biggest land and air-land defence exhibition in the world. It runs every two years at Paris-Nord Villepinte, organised by COGES for the French defence industry association. The 2026 edition opens 15 June and runs to 19 June. The comparison set is 2018, 2022, 2024 and 2026, since the 2020 edition was cancelled during COVID.
This report reads the show as an indicator. Not the products, but what the event itself reveals: where the money flows, what gets signed, who shows up, and which technologies are winning the floor.
The pattern is consistent across all four editions. Eurosatory has become the trade-show face of Europe's rearmament.
Exhibitor count climbed from 1,743 in 2022 to about 2,030 in 2024 to more than 2,300 for 2026, and the show added a fourth hall. The growth tracks the war.
The headline activity is letters of intent and memoranda. Read the June announcements as a roughly six-month leading indicator of where real contracts land.
Drones, counter-drone and autonomy now dominate the floor. The main battle tank is still there, but it is no longer the story.
The EU mobilised up to €800B (including the €150B SAFE instrument), NATO set a 5%-of-GDP target, and AI took 44% of European defence-tech venture funding.
France barred Israeli firms in 2024 and a court reversed it mid-show; more than 30 are reported back for 2026. Russia and Belarus remain absent under sanctions. The show is now a venue where geopolitics is contested directly.
Exhibitors went from 1,802 in 2018 to 1,743 in 2022 to about 2,030 in 2024 — and 2026 is sold out across all four halls at more than 2,300 exhibitors from 66 countries. Organisers do not add 20,000 square metres of space on a guess.
| Metric | 2018 | 2022 | 2024 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exhibitors | 1,802 | 1,743 | 2,030 | 2,300+ |
| Exhibiting countries | 63 | 62 | 61 | 66 |
| Professional visitors | 57,056 | 62,000 | 42,000 unique (76,000 adm.) | future |
| Official delegations | 227 | 250 | 355 | 330+ proj. |
| Delegation countries | n/a | 96 | 92 | 100 proj. |
| Floor area | 3rd hall | n/a | 166,617 sqm | 185,000+ · 4th hall |
| Conferences | 71 | 110 | 120 | 100+ |
One number is worth a footnote, because it gets misquoted everywhere. The 2024 balance reports 42,000 unique professional visitors and 76,000 total admissions across five days. Both are right — a person attending three days counts once in the first number and three times in the second. The widely cited "75,000+" is a rounding of admissions, not people.
The fourth hall is the most honest signal in the whole dataset. Visitor counts can be massaged and delegation numbers are soft, but physical space is booked and paid for months ahead. The show committed to 185,000 square metres because the demand was already in hand.
The most reliably documented items each year are MoUs and letters of intent. Firm priced contracts on the floor are the exception — the disclosed-value data is thin by design. The Franco-German next-gen tank (MGCS) was a letter of intent in both 2022 and 2024, and only became a real company in January 2025.
| Parties | Value | Scope | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| KNDS, Rheinmetall, Thales | Not disclosed | MGCS next-gen tank company | LoI → company Jan 2025 |
| Hanwha & Romania | $920M | K9 Thunder howitzers | Contract |
| Hanwha & Kongsberg | Not disclosed | Fire-control, combat systems | MoU |
| Armenia & France (KNDS) | Undisclosed | 36 CAESAR howitzers | Contract at show |
| Turkey MKE & Century Arms | $30M+ | License-build 7.62mm rifles for US | Contract at show |
| Ukraine (Ukroboronprom) | Not disclosed | Seven agreements | MoUs |
Ukraine signed seven agreements at its first official presence — three with Thales (a repair/modernisation JV, an EW & radar service centre, joint drone development), plus deals with Hexadrone, Exail, Arquus, and a GICAT–Technological Forces of Ukraine memorandum. None carried a public value.
| Parties | Value | Scope | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| KNDS, Rheinmetall, Thales | Not disclosed | MGCS project company | LoI (re-signed 2024) |
| Lithuania & Nexter | €250M | 18 CAESAR Mk II howitzers | LoI → contract Dec 2022 |
| PT Len & Nexter | Not disclosed | In-service support, Indonesian CAESAR | Contract |
| Belgium & Nexter/Arquus | Not disclosed | 9 CAESAR Mk II | Government order |
| Hanwha & Kongsberg | Not disclosed | IFVs, precision fires | MoU |
| Arquus & PT Pindad | Not disclosed | Future land-systems programmes | MoU |
| Nexter & MBDA | Not disclosed | Counter-drone, ground-air defence | Partnership |
Lithuania signed a CAESAR letter of intent on the floor in June 2022 and converted it to a firm contract that December. The 2018 cycle showed the longer arc: the Franco-Belgian CaMo partnership (382 Griffon + 60 Jaguar, ~€1.5B) was approved that autumn, not on the June floor.
Treat Eurosatory announcements as a leading indicator with roughly a six-month lag. The intent signed in June tends to become a contract by winter. Anyone tracking the European land-systems pipeline should read the show floor as a forward signal, not a transaction record.
The defence market is changing fast.
Understanding where capital, technology, and procurement are moving can create a significant advantage.
See How We Work →After host France, the 2026 floor is led by Germany, the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom. France does not publish its own count, but as host it fields the largest single contingent.
FY2025 company-reported defence revenue (defence segment where disclosed, group total for pure-play firms). Eight firms not yet reporting FY2025 are marked FY24. Bars are scaled to the largest defence-revenue figure.
| # | Company | Country | Defence rev. | Group total | Eurosatory focus |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Lockheed Martin | USA | $75.0B | $75.0B | Missiles, C2, air defence |
| 2 | RTX (Raytheon) | USA | $45B est. | $88.6B | Missiles, air defence, C-UAS |
| 3 | Northrop Grumman | USA | $42.0B | $42.0B | Ammunition, sensors, C2 |
| 4 | General Dynamics | USA | $40B est. | $52.6B | Armoured vehicles, artillery |
| 5 | BAE Systems | UK | $39.0B | $39.0B | Tanks (Abrams), wheeled AFVs |
| 6 | L3Harris | USA | $21.9B | $21.9B | Night vision, optronics, EW |
| 7 | Leonardo | Italy | $16B est. | $21.1B | Turrets, vehicles, optronics |
| 8 | Airbus D&S | EU | $14.5B | €73.8B grp | Mostly air, minor land C2 |
| 9 | Thales | France | $13.2B | $23.9B | Optronics, radars, C-UAS |
| 10 | Rheinmetall | Germany | $9.7B | $10.7B grp | Ammunition, IFVs, tanks (anchor) |
| 11 | Saab | Sweden | $8.3B | $8.3B | CV90, Carl-Gustaf, NLAW |
| 12 | Elbit Systems | Israel | $7.9B | $7.9B | Engines for land platforms |
| 13 | Hanwha Aerospace | S. Korea | $7.7B core | $19.3B grp | Artillery, drones, optronics |
| 14 | Czechoslovak Group | Czech | $7.3B | $7.3B | Large-calibre ammunition, AFVs |
| 15 | Rafael | Israel | $6.8B | $6.8B | Missiles, air defence |
| 16 | IAI | Israel | $6.4B | $7.4B | Loitering munitions, radars |
| 17 | MBDA | Europe | $6.3B | $6.3B | Spike, Trophy, Iron Dome |
| 18 | Rolls-Royce | UK | $6.1B | $25.5B grp | Ammunition, loitering munitions |
| 19 | PGZ FY24 | Poland | $5.0B est. | $5.0B | Primarily air, minimal land |
| 20 | EDGE Group FY24 | UAE | $4.9B | $4.9B | Leopard 2, Leclerc, CAESAR |
| 21 | KNDS | DE/FR | $4.75B | $4.75B | Large-calibre ammunition, AFVs |
| 22 | Aselsan | Turkey | $4.7B | $4.7B | Optronics, EW, C2, radars |
| 23 | Dassault Aviation FY24 | France | $4.3B | €6.2B grp | Tactical vehicles, ATGM |
| 24 | ST Engineering | Singapore | $4.06B | $9.4B grp | Krab, Borsuk, ammunition |
| 25 | Textron | USA | $3.3B est. | $14.8B | AFVs, artillery, ammunition |
| 26 | LIG Nex1 | S. Korea | $3.1B | $3.1B | Missiles, guided weapons |
| 27 | Fincantieri | Italy | $3.0B est. | $9.9B grp | Radars, optronics, EW |
| 28 | Turkish Aerospace FY24 | Turkey | $3.0B | $4.3B | UAS, helicopters |
| 29 | Korea Aerospace | S. Korea | $2.7B | $2.7B | Tactical trucks, logistics |
| 30 | Hensoldt | Germany | $2.65B | $2.65B | IRIS-T air defence, ammunition |
| 31 | Hyundai Rotem | S. Korea | $2.5B est. | $4.2B grp | Mostly air, modest land |
| 32 | Baykar | Turkey | $2.5B | $2.5B | Robotics, EW, training |
| 33 | QinetiQ | UK | $2.45B | $2.45B | Drones, loitering munitions |
| 34 | Kongsberg | Norway | $2.38B KDA | $5.6B grp | UAS, weapon stations, NASAMS |
| 35 | Oshkosh Defense | USA | $2.2B est. | $10.4B grp | Weapon stations, NASAMS |
| 36 | Roketsan | Turkey | $2.0B+ | $2.0B+ | K2 tank, wheeled AFVs |
| 37 | Moog | USA | $2.0B est. | $3.9B grp | Missiles, rockets |
| 38 | Diehl FY24 | Germany | $2.0B | €4.7B | AFVs, tactical vehicles |
| 39 | General Atomics FY24 | USA | $1.9B | n/d | Ammunition, artillery, small arms |
| 40 | CAE | Canada | $1.8B | $3.4B grp | Mostly naval, minimal land |
| 41 | Navantia FY24 | Spain | $1.65B | $1.65B | Training and simulation |
| 42 | Indra Sistemas | Spain | $1.52B | $5.9B grp | Actuation, turret drives |
| 43 | Nammo | Nor/Fin | $1.37B | $1.37B | Turrets, Arquus vehicles |
| 44 | MKE FY24 | Turkey | $1.2B | $1.2B | Small arms, weapon stations |
| 45 | Patria | Finland | $1.17B | $1.17B | 6x6 vehicles, mortar systems |
| 46 | Chemring | UK | $0.63B | $0.63B | Radars, C2, EW, simulation |
| 47 | FN Herstal FY24 | Belgium | €556M | €934M | Naval, minimal land |
| 48 | John Cockerill FY24 | Belgium | ~$0.5B | €1.4B | Ammunition, rocket motors |
| 49 | Otokar | Turkey | ~$0.4B est. | $1.37B | C2 software, simulation |
| 50 | Havelsan | Turkey | ~$0.38B est. | $0.38B | Countermeasures, energetics |
Up from ~$390B on the FY2024 basis. On a group-revenue basis the same 50 firms clear $600B.
Lockheed, RTX, Northrop, General Dynamics and BAE. The US accounts for more than half of the group's arms revenue.
Roughly 1,950 SMEs and startups, size-banded to €35–70B (central ~€50B). An estimate, not a measurement.
| Band | Firms | Avg. revenue | Subtotal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mid-cap / Tier-2 | 200 | €120M | €24.0B |
| Established SMEs | 900 | €25M | €22.5B |
| Small SMEs | 600 | €6M | €3.6B |
| Micro-firms / startups | 250 | €1.5M | €0.4B |
| Long-tail total | 1,950 | ≈ €50B |
The anchor is ASD-Europe's reported European defence turnover of €183.4B in 2024, minus the primes. Much of that revenue is embedded in prime supply chains, so read it as gross exhibitor revenue rather than additive industry value.
The combined SIPRI arms revenue of the 14 largest primes that stayed in the Top 100 continuously: a rise of about 48% across the span. The 2026 bar uses FY2025 company-reported defence revenue (~$286B) and sits on a higher basis — read the final step as partly real growth, partly the change of measure.
For scale: SIPRI's entire Top-100 arms revenue went from $420B (2018) to $597B (2022) to $679B (2024). The European share (excl. trans-European groups) climbed from $102B to $151B. Czechoslovak Group entered the Top 100 only in 2024, up 193% in a single year.
The exhibitor base and its revenue rose together, and the steepest move came after 2022. Eurosatory's growth is not a venue story — it is the industry repricing itself for a war economy. The floor is where you can watch the rearmament cycle convert from policy into industrial activity.
A handful of primes set the tone of the show. They take the largest stands, bring the headline platforms, and host the delegations. These are the firms to know before walking the 2026 floor.
| Company | HQ | Ownership | FY revenue | What they bring |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KNDS | FR / DE | Private (FR/DE states + family) | €4.4B grp (FY25) | Leopard 2, Leclerc, CAESAR, Boxer, EMBT |
| Rheinmetall | Germany | Listed | €9.94B grp (€9B def.) | Ammunition, Lynx KF41, Panther, air defence |
| Thales | France | Listed (~26% state) | €22.1B grp (€12.2B def.) | Optronics, radars, comms, counter-drone |
| Leonardo | Italy | Listed (~30% state) | €19.5B grp | Turrets, vehicles, AW249, optronics |
| Hanwha Aerospace | S. Korea | Listed | KRW 26.6tn ($7.7B core) | K9 howitzer, Redback IFV, Chunmoo |
| Czechoslovak Group | Czech Rep. | Private | €6.74B grp (FY25) | Large-calibre ammunition, AFVs |
| Saab | Sweden | Listed | SEK 79.1B ($8.3B) | CV90, Carl-Gustaf, NLAW, air defence |
| Kongsberg | Norway | Listed (~50% state) | NOK 58.6B ($2.4B def.) | Weapon stations, NASAMS, missiles |
What happens when two national champions merge. Formed from Germany's Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and France's Nexter, it now owns the Leopard 2, the Leclerc, the CAESAR and the Boxer. Its booth is where the Franco-German tank question lives, and the EMBT demonstrator shown since 2018 is the physical face of that merger. A stock-market listing has been discussed around the June 2026 show.
The clearest winner of the cycle. Group revenue reached €9.94B in 2025, up 29% on the year, with roughly €9B in defence, and it guided to as much as 45% growth in 2026. It anchors the show with ammunition, the Lynx KF41, the Panther tank line and air defence, and has used recent editions for the boldest reveals on the floor.
The private Czech group that turned the ammunition shortage into scale. Group revenue jumped to €6.74B in 2025, from around €4B a year earlier, with large-calibre ammunition at the core. The standout example of a mid-tier firm becoming a prime on the back of the war economy.
The South Korean land-systems champion, with record 2025 sales and an export push that landed the K9 howitzer and Redback IFV across Europe, including the $920M Romania deal around the 2024 show. Korea's ability to deliver fast and at scale made Hanwha one of the most-watched stands for European buyers facing long queues at home.
The sensor and electronics backbone of the European floor — €20.6B in 2024, ~a quarter state-held, spanning optronics, radars, comms, soldier systems, vetronics and counter-drone. The busiest Ukraine-cooperation prime in 2024, signing three of Ukraine's seven agreements.
Italy's state-anchored champion, ~30% government-owned, €17.8B of 2024 revenue across helicopters, turrets, vehicles and optronics. Its 2024 headline was the international debut of the AW249 attack helicopter — one of the few primes that can equip a force from the turret to the rotor.
Best known for the Gripen, but its land business is central to Eurosatory. SEK 63.8B (~$6B) in 2024, making the CV90 IFV and the Carl-Gustaf and NLAW shoulder-fired weapons Ukraine used in volume. Few firms have had their products validated in the war as visibly as Saab's anti-armour line.
The quiet constant on the floor. The Norwegian group, ~half state-owned, reported NOK 41.5B in 2024. Its PROTECTOR remote weapon stations sit on vehicles from dozens of armies, and with Raytheon it builds the NASAMS air-defence system now defending Ukrainian cities.
Start with a correction that gets repeated wrong everywhere. Macron personally inaugurated the 2022 show — the first time a sitting French president opened it. The 2024 edition was opened by Defence Minister Sébastien Lecornu, not Macron. Many secondary write-ups conflate the two.
| Emmanuel Macron | President of France · 2022 |
| Sébastien Lecornu | Min. of the Armed Forces · 2024 · signed the drones pact |
| Emmanuel Chiva | Head of DGA · 2024 · co-signed drones pact |
| Suren Papikyan | Defence Min., Armenia · 2024 · first Armenian presence, signed with KNDS |
| Gen. Christopher Cavoli | SACEUR · 2024 · fireside chat on collective defence |
| Stacy Cummings | GM, NATO Support & Procurement Agency · keynote |
| Gen. Robert Brieger | Chair, EU Military Committee · toured pavilions |
| Oleksandr Kamyshin | Min. of Strategic Industries, Ukraine · oversaw 7 agreements |
| Marc Darmon / C. Beaudouin | GICAT chair / Exhibition Director · hosts 2024–26 |
Ukraine appeared officially for the first time in 2024, showing battle-tested systems like the Magura V5 and Raybird, at the level of Ukroboronprom and the Ministry of Strategic Industries. Official delegations climbed from 250 in 2022 (96 countries) to 355 in 2024 (92 countries), with 330+ projected for 2026; Gulf and Indo-Pacific delegations grew. The 2026 conference programme runs about 450 speakers across 100+ talks, around four strategic themes: multi-domain superiority; remote engagement and land manoeuvre; comprehensive security and crisis management; and industrial resilience and the war economy.
| Name | Role | Company | What they did |
|---|---|---|---|
| Armin Papperger | CEO | Rheinmetall | Unveiled GMARS and the KF51-U |
| Nicolas Chamussy | CEO | KNDS France | Signed the KNDS–Ukraine production JV |
| Emmanuel Levacher | CEO | Arquus | Unveiled the MAV Rx and Drailer UGV |
| Ahmet Akyol | President | Aselsan | Unveiled Skydome and wheeled Korkut |
| Pascale Sourisse | Senior EVP | Thales | Signed Thales–Ukraine agreements |
| Jaeil Son | President & CEO | Hanwha Aerospace | Signed the Hanwha–Kongsberg MoU |
| Kuldar Väärsi | CEO | Milrem Robotics | Largest-ever stand; THeMIS sold to Sweden |
The innovation zone had its own names. The 2024 Eurosatory Lab Start-ups Challenge was won by Picogrid (US command-and-control, led by Zane Mountcastle), alongside Sweden's Mirola Rescue and France's Actronika — a useful early read on which young firms the show's jury thinks matter.
The French defence ministry ordered COGES to bar Israeli defence firms after the Rafah strike, with about 74 Israeli companies registered.
A district court widened the ban to any Israeli citizen or business intermediary.
The Paris Commercial Court struck the exhibitor ban down as unlawful discrimination — but the reversal came mid-show and was largely moot, since most Israeli firms, including Rafael, did not exhibit.
France restricted Israeli firms at Euronaval (Oct 2024) and walled off Israeli booths behind black panels at the 2025 Paris Air Show. In March 2026 Israel halted all defence procurement from France. For 2026, more than 30 Israeli firms are reported registered — Rafael, Elbit, IAI — plus a national pavilion.
The Israel episode is not a side story. It is the test case for whether a European arms show can stay neutral ground when the host government has a foreign-policy position. So far the courts have protected participation and the executive has kept pushing back. Watch whether 2026 holds the line or breaks it.
The evidence does not support a single static winner. It shows the centre of gravity moving from platforms to unmanned systems, counter-drone and autonomy — a timeline of the war read off the show floor.
Armoured vehicles and platforms led; armed drones were close to taboo.
Drones and loitering munitions surged in the first months of the war, led by surveillance and reconnaissance.
A decisive pivot to weaponised unmanned systems and counter-drone, with the floor consensus that nearly every drone could carry a weapon.
The organiser rebuilt the live-demonstration zone around robotics, trench warfare and three-dimensional drone manoeuvres.
No source publishes a per-category breakdown. This is an analyst estimate from the cluster structure and activity-tag patterns. Exhibitors carry several tags at once, so shares overlap and sum to more than 100% — these convey relative scale, not measured share.
AI and autonomy do not get a clean row — they show up inside other categories rather than as a separate aisle. The four largest sectors are roughly comparable at the top, counter-drone is the clearest riser, and the platform categories are holding rather than growing. The 2026 clusters were reorganised around Drones & Robotics, Cybersecurity, CBRNe, and a new Financing & Export cluster — positioning the show inside the rearmament trend rather than just hosting it.
The through-line across four editions is the same one the rest of this report keeps finding. The crew left the turret, and Europe decided it wanted to build its own HIMARS. The platforms got more unmanned, more precise, and more European — in step with the war and the funding.
SIPRI puts 2025 world military expenditure at $2,887B, up 2.9% in real terms — the 11th straight year of growth. Europe reached $864B, up 14%, the highest total SIPRI has recorded.
Germany hit $114B, up 24%, above 2% of GDP for the first time since 1990. The US fall reflects the Ukraine and Israel supplemental appropriations running out. Ukraine's figure excludes donor military aid.
The European build-up is a set of named instruments — and the distinction matters. Some are EU grants, some are EU loans, and the largest single line is national fiscal space the EU is enabling rather than money the EU itself spends.
Entered force 29 May 2025. By September, 19 member states had expressed intent and demand exceeded the budget. Council green-lit 18 states by April 2026; first pre-financing (up to 15%) targeted for early 2026.
Up to 1.5% of GDP a year of extra defence spending above a 2021 baseline for four years, without triggering the EU deficit procedure. It is space, not a guarantee — 17 states had activated it by early 2026.
Agreed June 2025, by 2035: at least 3.5% core defence + up to 1.5% resilience, reviewed in 2029. Every member committed except Spain (~2.1% understanding).
The gap between the headline €800B and the hard committed money is the part most coverage misses. SAFE is real loans and EDF is real grants, but the bulk of the €800B is permission to spend, not cash on the table. The number to watch is SAFE disbursement through 2026, not the press-release total.
European defence, security and resilience startups raised $5.2B in 2024 and a record $8.7B in 2025, up 55% on the year while broad European venture grew 16%. The same firms fill the show's innovation zone.
UK led with $2.9B in 2025, Germany followed at $2.1B, and Munich was the top city at $1.7B.
Global figures depend heavily on definition. The 9x gap between Crunchbase and PitchBook for the same year is entirely a definitional artifact — pure-play military versus broad dual-use.
| Source | Definition | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crunchbase | Narrow (pure military / security) | $3.0B | n/a |
| CB Insights | Dual-use, equity only | $7.3B | $17.9B |
| PitchBook | Broad dual-use | $27.2B | $49.1B |
Anyone quoting a single global number without the definition is quoting noise.
| Company | HQ | Builds | Latest round / valuation | Combat use |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Helsing | Germany | AI strike software, HX-2 drones | $1.2B at $18B (reported) | Bundeswehr, Ukraine |
| Anduril | USA | Lattice autonomy, counter-UAS | $30.5B closed; $61B reported | US DoD, IVAS |
| Quantum Systems | Germany | ISR drones (Vector) | €180M at $3.5B | Ukraine, Bundeswehr |
| Tekever | Portugal | ISR drones (AR3, AR5) | €70M, >€1B unicorn | Ukraine, UK MoD |
| ARX Robotics | Germany | Unmanned ground vehicles | €42M total raised | Bundeswehr, Ukraine |
| Stark | Germany | Virtus loitering munition | $62M at $500M (closed) | German MoD, Ukraine |
| Auterion | US / Swiss | Drone-swarm software | $130M at >$600M | Ukraine, Pentagon |
Two headline rounds are reported but not formally closed as of late May 2026: Helsing's $1.2B at $18B was described as close to raising, not done, and Stark was in discussions for ~€300M at ~€2.5B on top of its closed $62M round. Anduril's official last valuation is $30.5B; secondary-market pricing implied ~$61B that is not official.
Helsing started as battlefield AI software, then in late 2024 began building its own HX-2 strike drones — by early 2026 delivering several hundred a month to Ukrainian units. A software company became a drone manufacturer because the war rewarded mass and autonomy at once.
AI and autonomous systems are simultaneously the top venture magnet and the top floor narrative. When private capital and a state-procurement show point at the same thing at the same time, it usually means the shift is real, not hype. The risk sits in the valuations, not the direction — a reported $18B for Helsing and an implied $60B+ for Anduril price in a decade of growth the contracts have not yet delivered.
In 2018 and 2022, Ukraine was a buyer and a backdrop. By 2024 it had its first official presence, a national pavilion, and battle-tested systems on display like the Magura V5 naval drone and the Raybird reconnaissance UAV. In one cycle it went from customer to co-production partner.
The presence was a backdrop; the documents were early frameworks.
Most were JVs and service centres to repair, modernise and build inside Ukraine rather than import. The Thales agreements alone covered a repair-and-modernisation JV, an in-country service centre, and joint drone development. The direction is local production, not procurement.
Four Ukrainian companies signed co-production agreements with Nordic and Baltic partners — outside Eurosatory but in the same logic. Helsing delivers several hundred HX-2 strike drones a month to Ukrainian units; Quantum Systems produces its Vector reconnaissance drone locally.
Ukraine also became the validation lab. "Battle-tested" is now a selling point on the floor — from Kvertus EW jammers to the FPV and naval-drone makers — and Ukrainian firms carry credibility no Western test range can match.
Ukraine is no longer a buyer at the show — it is becoming a production node and a proving ground. The flow of build-in-Ukraine and build-with-Ukraine agreements is the structural change, and it is the part of the 2026 floor most likely to keep growing regardless of how the war ends.
This report has argued the rearmament is real and converting. Intellectual honesty requires the strongest case against it. None of these reverses the direction — but each is a genuine brake.
The defence-tech rounds assume a decade of contract growth that has not yet arrived. A reported $18B for Helsing and an implied $60B+ for Anduril only make sense if procurement converts to revenue fast. If it converts slowly, the first place the gap shows is private valuations.
SAFE is loans that must be repaid, the ~€650B escape-clause figure is fiscal space that fiscally-stretched states may not use, and political cycles can reverse it. The US already cut spending 7.5% in 2025. A recession or budget-fatigue cycle would stall the order flow.
The pivot to attritable unmanned systems is a direct reading of Ukraine — but Ukraine's conditions (a near-static front, GPS-denied airspace, mass FPV) may not generalise. An army that under-invests in armour, air defence, logistics and trained mass could mis-learn this war.
The Israel-ban precedent, the Spanish opt-out from the NATO target, and recurring export-control friction show a single market that fractures under political pressure — raising cost and slowing the joint procurement SAFE and EDIRPA were built to enable.
The 2-million-shells-a-year figure is a capacity target, not confirmed output, and propellants, machine tools and skilled labour all lag the funding. Money committed faster than industry can convert it produces delays, not capability.
The most likely disappointment is timing, not direction. The money is being committed faster than the industrial base can absorb it, and the defence-tech valuations are the first place that gap would become visible. The thesis survives, but the path is rougher than the headline numbers suggest.
If the show is an indicator, here is what to read it for during the week of 15 June. Each item is a question the 2026 floor will answer.
More than 30 firms including Rafael, Elbit and IAI are reported registered — but France blocked them in 2024 and walled them off at the 2025 air show. The most-watchable political question of the week.
France has floated an intermediate-generation tank as a fallback for the delayed Franco-German programme. The show is the natural stage for that decision to surface.
Timed near the June show, it would turn Europe's largest land-systems group into a traded company.
First pre-financing was targeted for early 2026. Whether real euro is flowing by June tells you if the €150B instrument is converting from allocation to spend.
Organised around trench warfare and three-dimensional drone manoeuvres — the clearest physical reading of Ukraine's lessons.
Rather than the usual letters of intent and memoranda.
Does 2026 confirm the build-up is converting from money and intent into hardware and contracts — or does it show the first signs of the timing gap the bear case warns about?
The cleanest way to read Eurosatory 2026 is not as an event but as a confirmation. The growth of the show, the war-economy theme, the new financing cluster and the robotics-heavy demonstrations are all the trade-show expression of a European defence build-up you can now see in three places at once: budgets, venture capital, and floor space.
The single sharpest signal on the floor is the relative decline of the main battle tank as the centre of attention, against the rise of cheap, attritable unmanned systems. That is not a fashion. It mirrors exactly what the war has taught, and the capital is following it.
So the question is not whether defence is growing — it clearly is. The question is whether the unmanned-and-autonomy shift that the floor and the funding both point at turns out to be the durable structure of the next decade, or the first overcorrection after a war that rewarded it. Eurosatory 2026 will not answer that. But it is the best single room in the world to watch it play out.
Figures draw on primary and official sources first: official Eurosatory materials and the post-show balance, company filings, the SIPRI Top 100 arms producers and world military expenditure datasets, NATO and EU institutional releases (European Commission, Council of the EU, European Parliament), and credible defence trade press (Defense News, Janes, Shephard Media, Breaking Defense, EDR Magazine, Army Recognition, Reuters). Organiser figures are treated as promotional where they cannot be cross-checked.
On company revenue, the table uses FY2025 results — the most recent full year, reported by most calendar-year firms between January and April 2026. Because SIPRI's 2025 arms-producers list does not appear until late 2026, the ranking uses company-reported defence revenue rather than SIPRI's arms-only measure. The two are not identical, and company-reported figures run higher, so the FY2025 totals are not perfectly comparable to the FY2024 SIPRI figures in earlier drafts.
A few figures are estimates rather than measurements, and are marked as such: the long-tail revenue of exhibitors beyond the top 50, and the per-category sector sizing. Two venture rounds (Helsing, Stark) were reported but not formally closed at the time of writing. The 2026 exhibitor, delegation and conference numbers are registrations or projections, since the event is still ahead. Where a number could not be verified, the report says so rather than picking a convenient figure.
Editions & exhibitor data: Eurosatory official (2024 record edition & post-show balance; 2026 exhibitors/conferences; 2022 summary), Wikipedia edition statistics, Army Recognition 2022/2024 coverage, EDR Magazine, Media India.
Company revenue & industry scale: SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing Companies 2024; Defense News Top 100; company FY2025 results releases (Jan–May 2026); ASD-Europe key data (€183.4B European defence turnover, 2024).
Deals & contracts: Defense News & Rheinmetall (MGCS Jan 2025); Army Technology (Hanwha–Romania K9); Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine & Militarnyi (seven agreements); The Defense Post & Asbarez (Armenia CAESAR); Defense News (Lithuania CAESAR/Patria).
Politics & the Israel question: French Ministry of the Armed Forces; France 24 & Usine Nouvelle; GICAT drones pact; Times of Israel & Jerusalem Post; Breaking Defense & Defense News (Euronaval 2024, Paris Air Show 2025).
Spending & financing: SIPRI military expenditure 2024/2025; European Commission (Readiness 2030, SAFE, EDF, EDIRPA, ASAP, EDIP); Council of the EU; European Parliament EPRS; European Investment Bank / Euronews; NATO Hague Summit Declaration.
Defence-tech venture: Dealroom & NATO Innovation Fund; Defense News (PitchBook, CB Insights); Crunchbase; TechCrunch (Anduril, Helsing); Tech.eu & EU-Startups (Quantum Systems, Tekever, ARX); Sacra & TNW (Stark); Bloomberg (Auterion).
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